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A NEW WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
By ERIC O'N. FISHER] 
Extending the theory of generational accounts, I show that the conventional 
current account is not related to the real effects of a country's fiscal policy. For 
any international array of fiscal policies, a country can implement its own policy 
so that the conventional government and current account deficits are zero in 
every period. I argue that economists should develop a new measure of the 
current account. This measure is forward looking and keeps track of expected 
transfers between countries. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper uses a technique first developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and 
then generalized by Kelly (1991) to show that a country can implement its fiscal 
policy in a way that satisfies any exogenously imposed constraint on the path of the 
current account. Using the model of overlapping generations, Kelly establishes a 
quite general result: taxes can always be timed so that an economy's budget deficit 
satisfies an arbitrary constraint even though fiscal policy has real effects for every 
agent in every period. 2 I extend this work in two directions: first by demonstrating 
that this intuition is true for the open economy; and second by showing that it 
carries naturally into stochastic environments. 
Although this paper has a theoretical focus, its implications for empirical 
economists and policy makers are profound. The result below is not a theoretical 
curiosum; it gets at the essence of what economists ought to measure when they 
compile current account statistics. Just as a conventional corporate balance sheet is 
misleading if unfunded liabilities are not reported, the conventional current account 
is misleading when expected net transfers to abroad have changed. For example, 
when the United States shut down Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the 
Philippines in the months after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, there was a change 
in the stream of expected net transfers to abroad. A conservative estimate of the 
1 I thank two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and Karl Shell for conversations 
that shaped profoundly my ideas on this subject. I am also grateful to Alan Viard, Jim Peck, Mario 
Crucini, and seminar participants at the State University of New York at Albany, Syracuse 
University, the Ohio State University, the 1994 summer meetings of the Econometric Society at 
Quebec, the Australian National University, La Trobe University, Auckland University, the New 
Zealand Treasury, and Otago University for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any 
remaining errors are my own. 
2 In a simple model, McCandless with Wallace (1991, p. 88) showed that allocations in an 
equilibrium with government bonds can also be supported in an equilibrium with lump-sum taxes 
and transfers in which the government debt is zero in each period. 
present value of this change is 20 billion dollars. This is an increase in the United 
States' net foreign assets, and it should be reflected in the properly defined current 
account for 1992.3 
Dewald and Ulan (1990) have made a similar point. They argue that the 
conventional measure of the current account is misleading largely because it uses 
historical, not market, values of net foreign assets. I extend this insight by emphasiz­
ing that a correct measure of changes in net foreign assets ought to incorporate all 
foreseeable net transfers to abroad. It is likely that the market value of net foreign 
assets reflects accurately expected future private payments to abroad. But there is 
no conventional measure that captures expected unilateral public transfers to 
abroad. 4 
One implication of my work is that "balance-of-payments disequilibria" need not 
be related to a country's government deficit as usually measured. Hence, it may not 
be meaningful to make international lending conditional upon "structural adjust­
ments" that decrease conventional measures of aggregate demand. 5 Such recom­
mendations may be misguided, and policy makers ought to use generational ac­
counts to measure the effects of fiscal policy. On this point, Auerbach, Gokhale, and 
Kotlikoff (1991) are quite right. 
Of course, a country's external deficit is the sum of its private and public net 
borrowing. This tautology is often used to argue that the external deficit places some 
constraints on fiscal policy. Howard (1989) gives the conventional wisdom: he 
describes policies that reduce a country's loss of net foreign assets when the 
expected profile of the trade balance may not be "sustainable." A sustainable profile 
for a country's external deficit depends, however, upon the fiscal policies of all the 
countries in the world economy, as I have emphasized elsewhere (1990). Since there 
is no simple relationship between the conventional government deficit and the real 
effects of fiscal policy, a deterioration on the conventional current account may not 
necessitate a decrease in the conventional government deficit. 
The right way of thinking about the relationship between the internal and 
external deficits is to use generational accounts. In the open economy, what matters 
is a measure of the present value of net transfers from abroad. Again, this measure 
depends upon the fiscal policies of all countries in the world economy, and it need 
not be zero in any period. In the penultimate section of this paper, I argue that the 
aggregate generational current account, the annual change in the expected present 
value of net transfers from abroad, is an appropriate measure of the external deficit. 
3 The statistical discrepancy in the United States' current account deficit was roughly 12 billion in 
that year. 
4 For example, increased expected military aid from abroad in the wake of the Gulf War should 
be reflected as an Egyptian "foreign asset" on a meaningful measure of the external account for 
Egypt in 1991. 
5 The idea that there is a link between the conventionally measured government deficit and the 
external deficit is tenacious in the minds of policy makers. Williamson (1983), for example, describes 
the International Monetary Fund's perception of how its policies influence countries' external 
deficits and public sector borrowing requirements. 
If the aggregate generational current account worsens, then some domestic resident 
will suffer lower utility. This simple fact is not true of the conventional current 
account. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and 
its equilibrium. Section 3 shows that the conventional current account is not 
meaningful. A meaningful alternative is proposed in Section 4: the aggregate 
generational current account. Section 5 is a brief conclusion emphasizing some of 
the practical implications of my arguments and putting forth an agenda for empirical 
work. 
2. THE MODEL AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM 
The model extends the seminal work of Balasko and Shell (1980 and 1981) by 
allowing for several agents in each generation and several different assets,6 and it 
incorporates uncertainty by adopting the framework of Manuelli and Peck (1990). In 
order to keep the theoretical exposition succinct, the model is presented in a very 
cursory manner. 
The set of agents born at time t is Go and the index set of the agents in the world 
economy is G = U~=oGs' Agents live for two periods;? thus, the set of agents 
trading at time t z 1 is Gt - 1 U Gt . A list of countries is a partition of G; there are 
HZ different countries. Hence, if :if = {Gl, ... , G//l'} is a partition of G, then h E Gj n 
Gt is a resident of country j born at time t. 
I consider a stochastic exchange economy with /' perishable goods available in 
each period. The endowments of agent h E Gt are 
Wh = (0, ... ,0, wh, wh+ 1 ,0, ... ), 
where wfz E ~~ is the vector of goods the agent has at his disposal at time t. 8 I 
make no assumptions about the location of wI; i, the ith good available to agent h in 
period t; hence, an agent can be endowed with nontraded goods and traded goods 
located in other countries. 
The state of the economy at time t is 
where ()t includes random variables other than the agents' endowments. I assume 
6 These assets are stores of value that bear state-contingent interest, and they are used to 
implement countries' fiscal policies. The reader should think of them as government bonds 
denominated in different currencies. 
7 This assumption is not at all restrictive; see Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980) for an algorithm 
that converts any truly dynamic economy with arbitrary demographics into the one described here. 
8 Note that agent h E Go is endowed with goods only during the (first and) last period of his life. 
Also, the assumption that an agent may not be endowed with positive amounts of each good is more 
general that that in Balasko and Shell (1980 and 1981) because I assume the existence of an 
equilibrium in the discussion below. 
that st E S, a compact state space. For most of what follows, one can take ()t to be 
constant, but I include it to allow the possibility of extrinsic uncertainty. Following 
Manuelli and Peck, I assume that {st}~= 1 is a Markov process with transition 
probability P(s, A), describing the probability that St+1 EA ~ S, given that St = S E S. 
I assume that this stochastic process has a unique invariant measure A. 
A history at time °t is a list of realizations of this process, 
The agents in period t know this history before they make their consumption and 
asset choices, and the description of goods and asset prices are sequences of random 
variables. 
Agent h E Gt has preferences that are represented by an expected utility function 
defined on the goods that are available to him in the different histories that he 
might face. His expected utility is summarized by E{u h(xfl(Sf), 
x~+ 1(St+ 1))}, where expectations are taken with respect to the history st. Hence each 
agent's state-contingent allocation is a sequence of (measurable) functions 
where both xfz(st)E ~~ and Xfl+ 1(Sf+1)E ~~. The list of goods prices in the world 
economy is an analog<?us sequence, 
where pt(st) E ~~. This notation emphasizes that prices depend upon the history of 
the world economy. I use the normalization that p 1, 1(s1) = 1 for all histories s 1. 
Hence, these functions are state-contingent present value prices, and 
pt,i(st)jp t+1, i(St+1) is the ith commodity's realized "own-rate of interest" between 
periods t and t + 1. 
Agents receive lump-sum tax transfers in the different fiat assets in the world HZ 
economy. The vector of transfers to h E Gt is 
where now both m~/st) E ~nt and m~z+1(st+1) E ~//l. If m~j(st) < 0, then agent h is 
taxed in currency j after history st. Likewise, an agent receives a subsidy from 
country j after history st if m~j(st) > O. 
The sequence of asset demands of h E Gt is 
h E Gt acquires net additions of (saves) type j assets in the first period of his life. 
The present prices of the assets are HZ 
where qt(st) E ~~ is the vector of fiat assets prices after history st. 
Since agents in the same generation make choices under uncertainty, there will be 
a market for state-contingent contracts in each period. I assume that such a market 
opens after these agents are born and offers a security paying a constant income in 
each state in the next period. The demand of h E Gt for this Arrow security is 
Zh = (O, ... ,O,zh(st),zfz+ 1(st+1)'O, ... ), 
where zh(st) E ~. The sequence of prices of this security is 
where ,t+1(St+1) = ,t+1 for all realizations St+1. 
I can now state the consumer's problem succinctly. Given history st, agent h E Gt 
chooses xh(st), Yh(st), and zh(st) and also chooses Xfz+1(St+1)' Yh+ 1(St+1)' and 
Zh+ 1(St+ 1) for each St+ 1 to solve9 
(1) maximize E{uh ( xfz( st), Xh+ 1(St+ I))} 
subJect t~ 
(i) p·xh +q·Yh +r·z/z ~P·wh +q·m/z; 
(ii) xfz(st) ~ 0, Xfl+ 1(St+ 1) ~ 0; 
(iii) yfz(st) + yfz+ 1(St+ 1) ~ 0; and 
(iv) zfz(st) + zfz+ 1(St+ 1) ~ o. 
In other words, he maximizes expected utility conditional on the history st. Note 
that these constraints hold for every realization St+ 1; hence, (i) expresses compactly 
as many constraints as there are states of nature in period t + 1. Constraint (i) states 
that the consumer maximizes expected utility subject to a present-value budget 
constraint, and its inner products are well defined because only finitely many of the 
elements of xh' Yh' Zh' W h, and mh are not zero. Constraint (ii) states that agents 
may not short any commodity, and (iii) states that no agent may die a net debtor in 
any of the currencies. It is important to emphasize that (iii) allows an agent to HZ 
borrow and lend in any currency in order to smooth consumption during the course 
of his life. Finally, constraint (iv) states that the agent may not create an Arrow 
security that he does not redeem. 
9 The problem for h EGo is quite simple since he faces no uncertainty. 
Let Yil describe the cumulative fiat asset holdings of agent h E Gt • This sequence 
is given explicitly by 
Yh = (0, ... , 0, y~ ( S t) , y~ ( S t) +Y/1+ 1 ( S t + 1 ) , 0, ... ), 
each of whose elements is in ~ /7l-. Consider also 
Mt(st) = L, L, m7z(sk), 
k=l hEG 
the HZ -dimensional vector representing the sum of all injections of the different 
currencies that have occurred up to time t. Then 
is a profile of national debts for all HZ countries. Also, let 
be this agent's stock of the Arrow security. 
A rational expectations equilibrium is a sequence of goods and asset prices and a 
corresponding list of allocations and asset demands that are all functions of the 
history of the economy. Thus, for history st and realization St+ l' a rational 
expectations equilibrium consists of 
(2) and 
such that 
(i) (x/z' Yh' Zh) solves (1); 
(ii) LhEGxh~LhEGwh; 
(iii) LIl E GYh ~ M; and 
(iv) LIl E CZh ~ 0. 10 
Condition (D states that allocat~ons and asset demands are chosen to maximize each 
agent's expected utility subject to the natural constraint after any history. Condition 
(ii) is that of material balances; 11 it is an infinite-dimensional vector inequality each 
of whose elements keeps track of one dated commodity. This inequality is well 
defined because there are only finitely many agents in the world economy at anyone 
time. Condition (iii) shows how the stocks of the HZ different asset markets clear; it 
10 I stipulate that y~ = 0 E [R/?t and z~ = 0 for all h EGo' 
11 If there are nontraded goods in the /7/ different countries, then (ii) is necessary but not 
sufficient. One must further stipulate that the demands and supplies for such goods involve only 
subsets of the agents. Then the extra condition is Liz E GjXfz'i(st).:::; Liz E GjWfz'i(st) for each commod­
ity (t, i) that is a nontraded good in country j after history st. 
too is an infinite-dimensional vector inequality. The right side of (iii) describes the 
evolution of the stock of HZ different outside assets; hence (iii) is the analog of (ii), 
although one condition expresses an equilibrium in stocks of assets and the other an 
equilibrium in the flow of commodities. Constraint (iv) is analogous, although here 
one sees that the net supply of Arrow securities is zero after any history. 
The next section shows why a country's current account is a poor measure of the 
real effects of its fiscal policy. Holding fixed the expected utility of each of the 
agents in the world economy after any history, a country always has a fiscal policy 
that satisfies any given constraints on its current account and government deficit. 
Since such an equilibrium supports arbitrary transfers of resources between coun­
tries and between generations, the conventional measure of the current account 
does not capture the real effects of governments' policies. 
3. WHY THE CONVENTIONAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IS A POOR MEASURE 
OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT 
Until now, I have been very general about the specification of each country's 
policy of lump-sum tax transfers. Assume now that only country j can levy taxes or 
subsidies using asset j; indeed, it is difficult to imagine another definition of a 
country in a model this general. Assume also that Gj n Gt =1= 0 for each t z 0; in 
other words, each country has at least one person born in each period. Again, it 
would be hard to imagine a country whose population died off and then started up 
again. 
The present-value of country j's conventional current account iS 12 
(3) bt,j(st)=pt.[ L.(Wh-Xfl)] 
hEGJ 
Equation (3) is a description of the conventional current account because the first 
term in square brackets allows agents to have endowments located anywhere in the 
world. If h E Gj owns commodity (t, i) located abroad, then pt,i(st)wh,i(st) is the 
present-value of the flow of earnings accruing to ownership of that foreign real 
asset. The conventional current account consists of three elements. The first is the 
balance on goods and services, the second is net factor payments, and the third is 
net transfers from abroad. Since this model is general enough to allow for the 
domestic ownership of goods located abroad, the first term in brackets in (3) 
captures both the balance on goods and services and the analog of net factor 
payments from abroad. The last two terms in brackets in (3) are the present value of 
12 For notational convenience, I have suppressed in (3) the dependence of prices and quantities 
on the history st. 
net transfers from abroad, and they are subject to the same ambiguity as annual tax 
collections in the domestic economy.13 
The profile of the present value of the current account of country j is 
A history-dependent constraint on country j's current account is 
where b j = {3j (i.e., bt,j(st) = (3t,j(st) for any st). This general formulation allows 
many specific interpretations. It can express the constraint that country j's current 
account is balanced in every period, that the present value of the current account be 
balanced after every business cycle, or that the asymptotic present value of country 
j's net foreign assets be zero. A constraint on a country's current account might be 
imposed, for example, by an international lending institution. 
I will denote currency-j transfers to h E Gt by the sequence 
j - (0 0 t, j( t) t+ 1, j( ) 0 )m h - , ... , ,mil s ,mh St+l' , .... 
Then a fiscal policy for country j is the list 
where the definition of mf~ makes explicit that one's transfers depend upon the 
history of the world economy up until his dotage. Although there is no role for 
purchasing public goods or imposing distorting taxes in this economy, this limitation 
is not serious because a country's fiscal policy is really the pattern of financing its 
public expenditures. Hence a description of how a country's taxes fall on each of the 
individuals in the world economy is the fullest possible specification of its fiscal 
policy. 
I can now state my result. 
13 A large part of unilateral transfers consist of grants to other foreign governments. During the 
last two decades, the United States' net transfer payments to foreign governments have been roughly 
four times as large as net transfer payments to foreign individuals. This poses a technical problem in 
a model of overlapping generations since one keeps track of transfers from governments to 
economic agents. This difficulty is overcome by induding finitely-lived "administrations" in the list 
of agents in the world economy. These administrations have no endowments, and their utility 
functions are constant on the space of commodity bundles. Hence, they have no effect on the 
material balances condition describing equilibrium. Then the two theorems proved below have the 
added interpretation that countries can implement their fiscal policies so that the present value of 
their transfers to foreign administrations remain unchanged when the current account satisfies an 
arbitrary profile. 
THEOREM. Consider a rational expectations equilibrium consistent with some array 
of fiscal policies. Let {3j be a constraint on country j's current account. If currency j is 
valued after any history, then country j has a fiscal policy satisfying this constraint, and 
this policy has no effect on the utility ofany agent in the world economy after any history. 
PROOF. See the Appendix. 
The proof of the theorem constructs a fiscal policy that works in a simple way. 
After any history SI, the government of country j picks some foreigner in generation 
1 and delays transfers (or borrows from abroad in the first period). It promises him 
sufficiently large future transfers (with state-contingent interest) so that his con­
sumption plans are unchanged for any realization of S2. Hence, prices and quanti­
ties are unchanged after any history s 1 and for any realization s2. 14 The government 
of country j uses a clever swap of liabilities and assets towards foreigners that has 
no real effect on any agent and makes the current account as "healthy" as necessary. 
Then it repeats this process with a new foreigner in the next period. The proof uses 
the assumption that currency j be valued after any history. But this is the least that 
one can hope for if an international agency is going to impose an arbitrary 
state-contingent profile on the current account. 
Inspection of equation (3) shows that transfers from country j to its own residents 
do not affect the current account if the goods and services balance is unchanged. 
Hence, the government of country j even has a policy tool left over to satisfy any 
constraint on its own budget deficit: it can time transfers to its own residents in 
order to satisfy any constraint on its internal deficit! In other words, all of Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff's (1987) profound objections to the conventional measure of the 
government budget deficit are still true in the open economy. In fact, only transfers 
that increase the wealth of generations currently alive can cause a deficit on the 
balance on goods and services. Hence generational deficits, not conventional deficits, 
influence the trade account, and there is no simple relationship between a country's 
generational deficits and its conventional current account because different agents 
have different marginal propensities to consume from increases in permanent 
income. 1S 
Since a perfect foresight equilibrium is a special case of a rational expectations 
equilibrium, the theorem is an important generalization of the results of Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) and Kelly (1991). These authors had the right intuition: 
conventional macroeconomic statistics that include transfers among agents have no 
immediate foundation in utility theory. This conclusion is quite robust, and 
economists should be cautious about how we interpret some conventional macroeco­
nomic statistics. 
It is important to make clear what the theorem does and does not say. A rational 
expectations equilibrium describes implicitly the utility of each agent in the world 
14 Such a policy is akin to Charnley and Polemarchakis' (1984) notion of an open-market 
operation using a "real" asset. 
15 Many econometric analyses have found only weak evidence that budget deficits affect the 
conventional current account. See Evans (1990) for a good discussion. 
economy after any history. Consider this description as fixed. Then the theorem 
states that country j has a fiscal policy satisfying any constraint on its external 
balances, and this policy still supports these utilities. The theorem does not state the 
selection of a particular equilibrium is independent of what country j does. If agents 
use information about the timing of a country's deficit as a way of selecting 
equilibria, then that deficit does matter. In other words, constraints on the current 
account need not matter, but they may not be entirely irrelevant either. 
The conventional measure of the current account is relevant to the extent that 
people condition their choices on it. If people think a large conventional deficit 
indicates that country j is undergoing a balance-of-payments crisis, then their 
actions may well influence the equilibrium in the world economy. But the theorem 
states that country j always has a fiscal policy that will allow it to run a balanced 
conventional current account even when agents presume that there is a putative 
crisis on the external accounts. 
Another implication of the theorem is that two identical conventional current 
accounts may have quite different real economic effects.16 Unilateral transfers to 
abroad have different real economic effects, depending upon the marginal propensi­
ties to consume and import of the foreigners receiving the transfers. International 
economists have long had the intuition that external deficits used to finance 
domestic investment are somehow different from thQse that are used to increase 
domestic consumption. This intuition is quite correct, and I will come back to it in 
the next section. 
4. A MEANINGFUL MEASURE OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT 
The theorem shows that the conventional current account is just not a meaningful 
measure of a country's external deficit. What is a good measure of this deficit? I 
propose a measure called the aggregate generational current account. Decreases in the 
aggregate generational current account indicate that some domestic agent will 
experience decreased utility after some history. This is a sound utility-theoretic 
foundation for a proper measure of the external deficit. 
Defining the aggregate generational current account will require a bit more 
notation. Let I~ be the index set of goods in the endowment of agent h that are 
located in country j, and define the sequence 
.- (0 if (t, i) $ I~ ,., ) 
Wh - t i 
otherwise.w1z' 
The present value of the foreign assets of h E Gt n Gj are 
16 An anonymous referee helped me emphasize this point. 
where I have been careful to include both real assets and transfers from foreign 
governments in this definition. The present value at time t of the expectation of all 
current and future net foreign assets of country j is 
pt,j(st) =E( I: L f,,(Sk,Sk+d - L L [pow~ +qom{,]), 
k=t-l hEGknGj k=t-l hEGk\GJ 
where the expectation is taken after history st.l? This expression summarizes the 
expected value of both real and financial foreign assets. The first term in the 
brackets represents current and future transfers from abroad to the residents of 
country j, and the second term in the brackets is the expected present value of 
transfer from country j to abroad. The aggregate generational current account at time 
t is 
(4) 
where the first implicit expectation is taken after history st and the second is taken 
after st-l. This measure capture the annual change in the expected present value of 
a country's net foreign assets broadly defined. 
Fisher and Woo (1994) have constructed an aggregate generational current 
account using data from the post-war Korean economy. Calculating its historical 
values entails two big steps. First, one measures current net foreign assets in each 
year at market value. Second, for each year, one makes a projection of the present 
value of all net transfers from abroad, based upon information that was known at 
that time. 18 Then one sums the present values derived in these two steps and takes 
first differences. Calculating forecasts of the aggregate generational current account 
entails making explicit assumptions about exchange rates, interest rates, the market 
value of net foreign assets, and expected net transfers from abroad. 
The aggregate generational current account given in (4) has many appealing 
properties. First, temporary changes in exchange rates, the market value of net 
foreign assets, or interest rates have only a minor effect on this measure. On the 
other hand, a permanent depreciation causes an immediate improvement in the 
aggregate generational current account. Just as the inflation tax decreases 
the real liabilities of the central government, so does a depreciation make net 
transfers to abroad· less onerous. Hence, a permanent depreciation increases the 
utility of some domestic resident. 19 
17 Note that fh(St-l, St) = fh(St) for h E Gt- 1. 
18 For a country with large foreign military commitments, this projection ought to be based on all 
publicly available information about future foreign policy; for a country with a sizable fraction of its 
labor force employed abroad, this projection should include the demographics of the work force and 
its expected future remittances from abroad. 
19 This aspect of the aggregate generational current account implies that much of the literature in 
international economics on the J-curve arises because the external deficit is measured inappropri­
ately. 
Also, a permanent increase in the market value of a country's net foreign assets 
increases its aggregate generational current account, and current and future genera­
tions can anticipate higher utility arising from a greater stream of payments from 
abroad. Further, a permanent increase in real interest rates improves the aggregate 
generational current account of a debtor country since it lowers the present value of 
expected payments to abroad. Finally, re-scheduling sovereign debt, so characteristic 
of the developing country "debt crisis" in the last decade, has no effect on the 
aggregate generational current account unless it affects the expected stream of 
payments between countries. 20 
The aggregate generational current account also allows one to differentiate 
between external deficits arising from consumption binges and those arising from 
increases in permanent income. Think of a country that has experienced an increase 
in expected net foreign assets, perhaps owing to a technological discovery making all 
of its generations better off. Such a country might quite naturally import in 
anticipation of higher future income. This activity appears as a deficit on the 
conventional current account, whereas the aggregate generational current account 
would quite rightly show a surplus. On the other hand, a country whose government 
runs generational deficits that are financed by foreigners must consider not only the 
conventional current account deficit but also the present value of expected pay­
ments to abroad. Of course, the aggregate generational current account captures 
these expected payments. 
5. CONCLUSION 
I have made a theoretical point in this paper: the conventional measure of the 
current account is not an economically meaningful concept. This fact is true for 
growing economies and for equilibria that do not satisfy an inter-temporal efficiency 
criterion. 21 Indeed, it is a robust property of equilibrium in dynamic models. This 
result has been well known for the budget deficit in the closed economy, and it has 
spurred some important research on appropriate measures of fiscal policy. This line 
of research has important implications for the open economy, and it casts doubts on 
whether the current definitions of "structural adjustments" make sense. 
The aggregate generational current account is easier to construct than Auerbach, 
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff's generational accounts because one need not keep track of 
20 There is little evidence that re-scheduling changed the market value of the North American 
banks who held much of this debt; see Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) for an event study. After having 
defined the aggregate generational current account, I am inclined to believe that the developing 
country "debt crisis" in the 1980's was much ado about nothing. Still, in the last decade, the United 
States government developed an inter-agency task force to assess the repayment capabilities of the 
major sovereign debtors, and the Bank of International Settlements created an "early warning 
system" to keep track of the aggregate exposure of commercial banks in the major industrial 
countries to sovereign debt. Both these institutions are apposite if expected payments from abroad 
are what matters in measuring a country's external accounts. 
21 Nothing in the arguments above assumed that there was a uniform upper bound on the 
conventional current account, government deficit, or the present value of endowments. In other 
words, we never assumed that the "interest rate" was greater than the "growth rate" of any 
macroeconomic variable. 
net official transfers to abroad for each generation. Instead, the nature of external 
accounts is such that one is interested in the sum across generations of these 
transfers. But, in another sense, my measure is a challenge to the empirical work on 
generational accounts. Since this work has been accomplished for the closed 
economy, it has assumed implicitly that the present value of net transfers from 
abroad is zero. There is no theoretical justification for this assumption in the model 
of overlapping generations, and there is little empirical support for it in the long 
time series on the present values of net foreign assets of several major industrial 
countries. While recognizing that the empirical work on generational accounts has 
been extremely valuable to date, I hope that the measure I have proposed will spur 
further empirical research in this area. 
The Ohio State University, U.S.A. 
APPENDIX 
PROOF OF THE THEOREM. Let m j be the fiscal policy of country j, and fix all 
other countries' policies. Let the constraint on the current account of country j be 
f3j. I will construct a new fiscal policy fhJ that leaves unchanged the present value of 
the wealth of every agent in the world economy and satisfies bt,jest) = f3 t, jest) after 
any history. 
First, for any history s1, let mkj(s I) = mkj(s I) for each h EGo' Second, for any 
realization s2' let 
for all but one agent hI E G I n (G\GJ). For this agent, let 
mk/(sl) = f31,j(SI)jq l,j(SI) - L mkj(sl). 
hE (GoUG 1)\{h 1} 
Then choose mh'/(s2) so that 
jwhere again mh'/(s2) is given by the policy m . Note that I have not changed the 
present value of the wealth of any agent h E Go U G I after any history S2. 
Let PA be the distribution induced by A on the product space n~= I St. Since A is 
the unique invariant measure, this new fiscal policy does not affect PA• Hence, asset 
demands and allocations satisfy the equilibrium conditions (2) for the case where 
t = 1. Thus the first term on the right side of (3) is unchanged, and bl,j(SI) = f31,j(SI). 
Assume mj has been constructed for the agents in Go U ... U G t . Let 
{( mt+l,j(st+l) mt+2,j(s ))} = {(mt+l,j(st+l) m t +2,j(s ))}h 'h t+2 hEG t + 1 h 'h t+2 hEG t + 1 
for all but one agent h t + 1 E G t + 1 n (G\GJ). For this agent, let 
m~1~+11,j(st+1) = f3 t + 1 ,j(st+1 )/qt+1,j(st+1) - L m~1+1,j(st+1). 
hE (GtUG t+l )\{h t+1 } 
Then choose m~1+2, j(St+2) so that 
t+l 
m t +2, j ( S ) = m t +2, j ( S ) - [q t + 1 , j ( S t + 1 ) /q t +2, j ( S )] m t + 1 , j ( S t + 1 ) 
h t+1 t+2 h t+1 t+2 t+2 h t+1 ' 
where again m~1+2, j(St+2) is given by the policy m j . Again, I have not changed the 
t+l 
present value of the wealth of any agent h E Go U ... U Gt + 1 after any history 
st+2, PA is unchanged, asset demands satisfy (2), and bt + 1, j(st+ 1) = f3 t+ 1, j(st+ 1) 
after any history. 
The proof then proceeds by induction. D 
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